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It isn’t news to anyone that email is becoming almost
unusable. Unsolicited commercial email (spam) peddles
a variety of dubious products, ranging from pharma-
ceuticals to abandoned bank accounts. The so-called
“phishers” try to steal user names and passwords for
online banking. And then, we have viruses, worms, and
other malware. Although there are would-be solutions
to these problems, some of them have the potential to
do far more harm than good.
An obvious approach to spam-fighting is some form of
sender authentication. If we know who really sent the
email, we can deal with it: either accept it, because
it’s from someone we know, or—if it’s spam—we can
chase down whomever sent it and take some sort of
judicially-sanctioned revenge. It’s simple, it’s obvious—
and it doesn’t work, for a number of reasons. Funda-
mentally, most people accept—and want to accept—
email from more or less anyone. Just while writing this
essay, I received no fewer than five legitimate pieces of
eamil, addressed directly to me, from new correspon-
dents. It does no good to have some assurance of a to-
tal stranger’s identity if you’re going to accept the email
anyway. Fundamentally, identity is only a concept that
makes sense within a shared context — without which
the sender’s authenticated identity, as opposed to the
merely asserted identity, means very little.
Of course, spammers can authenticate themselves, too.
Just as today they buy throw-away domains, in a world
of authenticated email they’ll buy throw-away authen-
ticated identities. Indeed, anecdotal evidence suggests
that the spammers have been the fastest adopters of
the prototype authenticated email schemes. We thus
have the following conundrum: if you use these anti-
spam techniques, statistically you’re more likely to be
a spammer!
Beyond that, remember that much spam comes from
hacked machines. Someone who “0wnz” your machine
can steal your online identity quite easily, including (of
course) any cryptographic keys you possess.
If authentication techniques don’t work against spam,
do they help protect us from phishers? Here, at least,
there is reason for optimism: a phishing attack is an im-
personation attempt; if we can really authenticate the
sender of the email, would we not be safe?
Unfortunately, the proposed email authentication tech-
niques won’t do the job. What you really want is proof
that “this is the party to whom I gave my money”; all
that this scheme can establish is that the sender owns
some plausible domain name. It says nothing about
your prior relationships We don’t have to imagine this
attack; one of the very first phishing incidents involved
email appearing to be from paypal.com; the actual do-
main was paypa1.com.
Consider, instead, a scheme where, when you opened
an account, the bank sent you a copy of its certificate.
This certificate could indeed be used to authenticate any
email from the bank. Note the crucial difference: such
a certificate is bound to a previous transaction, rather
than to a name.
Authenticated email solves some problems. If nothing
else, it hinders the spread of email worms, since the in-
fected machine will be positively identified. Further-
more, there are some situations where a list of per-
mitted senders is in fact used. In the best of these
schemes, purported identity is used to drive some sort
of challenge/response scheme. Authenticated email
would provide some protection here, though even with-
out it successful “joe jobs”—forgery of a legitimate
user’s identity—are relatively uncommon. The spam-
mer would have to select source-destination pairs of ad-
dresses to bypass simple-minded permitted sender lists.
However, there are serious disadvantages. Some are
logistical: with some of the proposals, inbound mail-
forwarding services such as acm.org won’t work prop-
erly; people will be sending mail from more or less any-
where that claims to be from acm.org. Other schemes
have trouble with mailing lists, such as those that add
administrative information to outbound messages.
But the most serious problem is one of privacy. If all
mail must as a practical matter, be signed, all mail be-
comes traceable. (Many anti-spam payment schemes
share this problem.) The U.S. Supreme Court has
noted that “anonymous pamphlets, leaflets, brochures
and even books have played an important role in the
progress of mankind. Persecuted groups and sects from
time to time throughout history have been able to crit-
icize oppressive practices and laws either anonymously
or not at all . . . It is plain that anonymity has sometimes
been assumed for the most constructive purposes.” Do
we want an electronic world without such advantages?
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